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202 Lauren Brubaker 
should have sufficient respect for Smith the philosopher to assume that 
he isn't blind to his own critique of men of system (TMS VI.ii.2.7-18). 
We should thus pay close attention to his explicit indications of the natural 
limits of his own 'obvious and simple system'. 
Smith was acutely aware of the problems facing the establishment of 
impartial justice and religious and economic liberty. This awareness makes 
it all the more necessary to explain and defend the advantages and to 
protect the achievements of these where they exist. Otteson and Smith are 
on the same side here, and that is the side of moderate liberalism. Smith 
is neither a traditionalist nor a libertarian. Liberalism is not well served 
by downplaying the difficulty of its realization by an overemphasis on 
unintended beneficial consequences. Once established. however, the advan­
tage of a tradit onal prejudice in its favor is not to be lightly dismissed. 
Adam Smith 
Why decentralized systems? 
Maria Pia Paganelli 
'I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for 
the public good' 
(WN IV.ii.9) 
James Otteson's book (2002) is a comprehensive and clear analysis of 
Smith's two worlcs - Wealth of Nations and The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments - and their relation. Otteson's detailed analysis shows how, 
for Smith, market systems and moral systems are similar. Both are gener­
ated by individual decisions. And both generate unintended systemic social 
order. I think Otteson's analysis is correct. In this paper I develop one 
possible implication of Otteson's reading of Smith (that Otteson did not 
develop) aimed at justifying his Smith's position (as read by Otteson). 
Smith describes human beings as imperfect and not perfectible. Given all 
their biases, delusions and mistakes, bow can individuals live together, be 
virtuous, and prosper? In both TMS and WN, Smith answers that individ­
uals do not know what is best for them and/or for �iety, but with a decen­
tralized process of trial and error they develop successful rules of behaviour 
and/or institutions that allow them to achieve their goals as well as, unin­
tentionally, social order. The question this paper asks is: was Smith accurate 
in describing how, aiming at something other than social order, individual 
decisions unintentionally and spontaneously generate social order? 
The answer I offer is yes. Smith's implicit model of social order works 
because it focuses on how to minimize the consequences of mistakes and 
imperfections in society rather than on how to create the best social system. 
I Why decentraUzed systems are preferred to 
centralized systems in theory and in practice 
A decentralized system is a system in which there are many autonomous 
and independent decision centres, as many as the number of individuals 
(or groups of individuals) present in the system. Individual decision centres 
choose accordingly to individual costs and benefits. The well-being of the 
system may not be taken into account individually, and the decision centres 
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may not be coordinated. A centralized system is a system in which there 
is one (or few) decision centre(s), the decisions of which are for the entjre 
system. 
Borrowing the concept from robust statistics (Mosteller and Tukey 1977), 
a robust system is a system that minimizes catastrophic results under non­
ideal conditions, even if it may not be the most efficient system under 
ideal conditions. It asks the questions: what is the worst that can happen? 
How is it avoidable? A fragile system is a system that collapses under 
non-ideal conditions, even if it may be the most efficient system under 
ideal conditions. It asks: what is the best that can happen? How is it 
achievable? 
Decentralized systems tend to be robust. Decentralized systems mini­
mize catastrophic results if there is a mistake, because of their very 
decentralized nature. Decisions are taken at the individual level, and their 
consequences remain at the local level. If a decision is incorrect and causes 
disasters, only the individual decision maker (or maybe his close surround­
ings) may face the catastrophe, but the rest of the system may remain 
unaffected. 
Centralized systems tend to be fragile. With centralized decisions, conse­
quences are global by definition. If an error is made with a centralized 
decision, the entire system is affected and likely to face disasters. 
Centralized systems that aim at achieving the best possible outcome expose 
themselves to catastrophic outcomes in case of mistakes. 
Smith claims that decisions taken at the individual level - a decentral­
ized system - generate social order both in the economic spherel and in the 
moral sphere. To Understand why Smith described a decentralized system 
as able to generate social order, let us ask ourselves: what is the alterna­
tive? The alternative to a decentralized system as described by Smith is a 
centralized system. Smith does not design the best social order ever, but he 
describes a social order that is able to cope with human imperfections. The 
decentralized spontaneous orders he describes are robust systems. 
Let us apply the two frameworks to analyze social systems.4 
Assume angelic selfless, unbiased, and rational men - perfect human 
beings or at least perfectible. This assumption can be used on two levels. 
Either all individuals are selfless, Wlbiased, and rational, or a group of them 
is. If only a group of individuals is selfless, unbiased, and perfectly rational, 
or at least more so than the rest of the population, this group should be in 
charge of leading the rest to perfection. Perfect social harmony is achiev­
able, even if with some effort, under the (central) direction of the privi­
leged group. This is the description (and prescription) of a centralized 
system. Centralized decisions made by the best individuals to better the 
conditions of others generate the highest performance for the entire social 
system, as in model A of Figw-e 5. On the other hand, if the best group is 
not in charge of the rest of society because of the existence of a decen­
tralized system (model B), society is not as wen off (B1<A1). But what if 
( 
I 
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all men are self-interested and self-centred? What if nobody is either perfect 
or perfectible? Using a centralized system under non-ideal conditions 
causes disasters (A�. A decentralized system does not (B.J. Similarly, if 
all indiv duals are basically perfect, there is no need for leadership, as 
all, being perfect, know what is best to do. Perfect social harmony is 
achieved effortlessly. But what would happen to a social order designed 
for perfect individuals, if the individuals turn out to be imperfect and not 
perfectible? 
Authority . . . would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man 
who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself/it to exercise it. ' 
(WN IV.ii.lO) 
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Figure 55 Perfonnance under centralized and decentralized systems 
Now, assume (or observe) imperfect and not perfectible men, cursed 
with defects, vices, greed, biases, and delusions. A decentralized system 
(model B) perfonns well. The consequences of individual (inevitable) 
mistakes are minimized because they are localized, and a stable social 
order is possible. 
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Given the imperfection of human nature, a decentralized system is like­
lier to generate a social order suitable to the human condition. Given the 
imperfection of hwnan nature, a centralized system, even if beautiful, is 
likelier to cause disasters because the consequences of decisions are global. 
In this sense, we can say with Smith, that a decentralized system of self­
interested individuals (a system of natural liberty) is able to generate a 
spontaneous, unintended, and good social order, by localizing the poten­
tially catastrophic consequences of human imperfections and frequent 
mistakes. 
ll Smith is right 
Smith describes how a decentralized system allows for a social order that 
is able to cope with all sort of human imperfections: (1) at the indiv dual 
level and (2) at the group level. 
The analysis of the individual can have at least three starting points: 
(a) all individuals are perfect; (b) some individuals are better than others 
and can lead the others to better their conditions; (c) all individuals are 
imperfect and not perfectible. Smith descn'bes all men as imperfect and 
not perfectible. Given his starting point, a decentralized system is the 
description of a system that works, at least better than a centralized one. 
Smith rejects the idea of human perfection. TMS is an account of human 
imperfection and systematic mistakes. Man is limited by his physical con­
ditions (TMS I.i.1.2). The use of imagination to relate to the rest of the 
world causes gross mistakes, all the time. We identify with the hero of a 
novel, even if it is not true. We feel sorry for the dead because they are 
cold and lonely when they are just dead (TMS I.i.l.13). The poor man's 
son believes that riches wil  make him happy, struggles all his life to achieve 
them, eventually to find out it is not true (TMS IV.l.8). Our impartial spec­
tator, who is supposed to lead us on the right way, is in reality partial and 
self-centred. The achievement of impartiality is basically not possible in 
human life. We are constantly deluded (TMS III). We are driven by pas­
sions, and only after the fact we rationalize our actions so that we can 
either live with ourselves or feel good about it (in particular TMS ill.4 and 
also WN V.i.f.26). We are envious, weak, vain, egotistic, narcissistic, and 
we struggle all our life to be someone we naturally are not so that others 
can praise us (TMS II1.3.4). 
Despite all this, societies do not often fall apart. There are at least two 
reasons for this, both related to polycentrism. An individual copes with his 
biases by multiplying the decision centres around him. If there is one deci· 
sion centre (an individual in isolation), biases are overwhelming and 
deforming. But in a social context, when the centres are multiplied, multi­
ple perspectives are available to dilute errors (TMS Ill.3.38-43). Similarly, 
a successful society copes with human biases and imperfections by having 
as many decision centres as possible, therefore trying not to impose 
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individual mistakes on others (for example WN V.i.g.7-9). On the other 
hand, when individuals are far from perfect, having a (beautiful) social 
order for perfect individuals will likely have catastrophic results (TMS 
VI. ii.2.17-18). 
Smith also rejects the idea that some individuals are somehow better 
than others and therefore should be in charge of the others.6 Political 
leaders, philosophers, and teachers are just as limited, imperfect, and mis­
taken as everybody else. There are no reasons for them to try to generate 
a social order better than (or to correct) the one spontaneously emerging 
from a decentralized system. Actually, there are reasons for preventing 
them from trying. Political leaders are corrupt and easily corruptible. They 
give in to the flattery of those who surround them and allow the creation 
of socially dysfunctional monopolies. So: 
[t]he statesman who should attempt to direct private people .. . would 
•
.
.
 assume an authority which could safely be trusted, not only to no single person, but to no council or senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it 
(WN IV.ii.lO; emphasis added) 
Philosophy is like any other employment, there is nothing special about 
it (WN I.i.9). Philosophers are like any other men, just vainer (WN l.ii.4), 
and wise men often simply 'fancied themselves such' (WN V.i.f.25). They 
believe things that tum out to be false ('History of Astronomy'). They 
think they can generate political and moral order, but 'notwithstanding 
. . . the very respectable authority of Plato, Aristotle and Polybius' we are 
left with violence, sanguinary factions, and immorality (WN V.i.f.40). 
Also educators are cormpted and incompetent 
If they [students] are not always properly educated, it is seldom from the want of expence laid out upon their education; but from the improper application of that expence. It is seldom from the want of masters; but from the negligence and incapacity of the masters who are to be had, and from the difficulty, rather the impossibility which there is, in the present state of things, of finding any better. 
(WN V.i.f.52) 
Any 'man of system' who tries to make decisions for others, disregarding (the imperfections ot) human nature, is bound to fail. A centralized decision-making system based on some superiority of certain individuals is 'folly'. Mistakes are unavoidable. The choice is between a system that minimizes their comequences and a system that globalizes them instead. Centralized systems are, had been, and will be present in human history. But they are not sustainable in the long run. Their 
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antidote is the multiplications of decision centres that disperse and mini­
mize the consequences of errors. Decentralized systems are orderly systemS 
that, even if imperfect, allow human society to exist, with all its defects, 
and without attempting unnatural improvements that result in disaster. 
Smith describes a stable social order generating from a decentralized 
system also at the group level. He allows for 'deviant' group behaviour. 
Men are neither perfect nor perfectible, and they perceive differently. What 
is thought as right or wrong may vary in time and place, or even within the 
same time and place. It is possible that the sympathetic principle with which 
harmonic and 'good' moral systems are explained generates approbation 
and emulation for anti-social group behaviours. There are brutal political 
factions, bloody religious factions, and even societies of thieves. Their 
existence is not a problem for Smith. Deviant and anti-social behaviours at 
both the individual and group levels are not in contradiction to the social 
order generated by a decentralized system. The threat to society is not one 
form of deviant behaviour or another, but is the attempt to either eliminate 
it or to centralize such deviant and anti-social behaviour. 'That zeal must 
be altogether innocent where the society is divided into two or three hun­
dreds, or perhaps into as many thousand small sects, of which no one could 
be considerable enough to disturb the public tranquillity' (WN V.i.g.8). 
Once again, Smith describes a stable social order which is able to minimize 
the effect of 'mistakes'. Given the imperfection of human nature, factions 
and deviant groups are inevitable. How to minimize the possible social 
damages of anti-social behaviour? Localize the area of effect as much as 
possible. The more decentralized the system is, the less danger it faces. 
ill Conclusion 
Otteson's account of Smith is accurate. And Smith's account of the devel­
opment of social order is accurate as well. Given the assumption, or the 
empirical observation, that human nature is imperfect and implies a large 
variety of mistakes, and given the choice between a centralized and a decen­
tralized system, a decentralized system is preferred both in theory and in 
practice, because it is better able to cope with the non-ideal conditions that 
characterize human conditions. Decentralized systems unintentionally gen­
erate imperfect, yet stable orders both in economic and moral spheres. 
Centralized attempts to develop market and moral orders would less likely 
generate good orders because they are less likely to survive our inevitable 
mistakes. 
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Adam Smith's theoretical 
endorsement of deception 
Eric Schliesser 
I Introduction 
James Otteson's Adam Smith's Marketplace of Life offers a lucid, original, and insightful reconstruction of a fourfold template that underlies and unifies Smith's approach to all kinds of social phenomena (pp. 285-9). After resurrecting 'The Adam Smith Problem' (ASP), Otteson employs this account to bury it for good. Otteson is refreshingly honest that he is offering a reconstruction of Smith's 'general model of a market' (p. 102), even if there is no 'explicit textual evidence' that Smith intended it as the 'key' to understanding 'the development and maintenance of all large­scale human institutions' (p. 258). For the sake of argument, I accept the reconstruction (for misgivings see Schliesser 2003a). Like a true Smithian philosopher, Otteson explains the invisible structure that combines the 'most distant and similar' elements of Smith's written universe (cf. Wealth of Nations l.i.9).7 Yet, I argue that Smith's views on theorizing shows that ASP is generated by too-partial an understanding of the moral psychology of WN and that the position that Otteson attributes to Smith, as a 'transcendent' endorsement of the marketplace of life (pp. 252-7), is itself, according to Smith, a (beneficial) 'deception'! Smith's commitment to philosophy falls outside Otteson's framework. 
ll Wonder and admiration in Wealth of Nations 
The crucial premise in Otteson's argument for reviving ASP is that in 
WN, Smith appeals 'only' to 'self-interest'; in WN there is no evidence that 
Smith thought that 'any motivation besides self-interest is active in human 
behavior' (p. 156). This is in stark contrast to the complex moral psychol­
ogy presented in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. This is not a problem in 
consistency between the two books, for nowhere is it suggested that the 
focus on self-love, which for Smith is 'the governing principle in the inter­
course of hwnan society' (p. 154, n. 30), would rule out other sources of 
motivation; none of the passages, which Otteson cites from WN (p. 155), 
go quite that far. Yet, as a reading ofWN, Otteson's position is incomplete. 
